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1. Introduction 
 
Moral Beneficence on Us 
  
Harm and suffering are bad things to cause. You can agree that you do not want to 
be responsible for causing it directly nor would you want to be responsible for 
contributing to it indirectly. You would not starve your kids, say, because you did not 
have any more food in the fridge and could not afford more for the three more days. You 
do not want to cause harm and suffering like this when you know you can do something 
to prevent the situation. Chances are you are going to go next door, downstairs, upstairs, 
somewhere, to find a small donation from someone. And the person donating food to you 
does not want to contribute to your kids’ harm and suffering, so of course she will donate 
some food. This chain of events shows that harm and suffering are bad things to cause, 
contribute to, and experience and you and any other rational person know harm and 
suffering are bad.  
 Now suppose there are nine million people at risk of dying in massive amounts 
every day because of starvation. Would you like to do something that can prevent these 
people from dying? Your first reaction would probably be, “wow, nine million people at 
risk of dying is outrageous and alarming!” so yes, you would like to do something if it 
means preventing the deaths of as many people as possible. Every single person is 
entitled to their life. It is horrible that people who are at risk of dying because of 
starvation are going through a struggle alone. The world is a better and easier place if we 
can depend on someone else in times of struggle. Because we know that harm and 
suffering are bad and that many of us are in a position to prevent harm and suffering, we 
would like do something about it. The same concept applies if your kids were starving 
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because you could not afford any more food. Because your neighbor knows harm and 
suffering are bad and is in a position to better the situation, she is willing to do something 
about it. Without being willing to do something about the situation, we become part of 
the problem.  
If we are in a state of good intentions, willing to prevent bad things from 
happening, why do we not just do what we are willing to do? If we are willing to donate 
food to our neighbor to prevent harm and suffering there, we should be willing to donate 
food or money to prevent harm and suffering for nine million people. We should be 
responding and acting in ways that adhere to our serious level of concerns for the nine 
million people at risk of dying. We should donate the most we can to international aid 
agencies. One way is to sacrifice all the things we do not really need fashionable 
clothing, luxurious appliances, the newest electronics, a huge house, and an expensive 
car. How is it right to consume all of the things that buy us our ideal lifestyles when we 
should be lending our resources and energies to the nine million people we are seriously 
concerned about. We should be sacrificing all of these things to have more money left 
over to donate to international aid agencies to provide these people their most basic 
needs, health, and life stability. Certainly these are major sacrifices but they are sacrifices 
that adhere to our severe level of concerns for others. But even though these major 
sacrifices adhere to our level of concerns for others and we are all willing to do 
something to prevent harm and suffering, we have a problem with actually lending 
ourselves to prevent harm and suffering like this. What are we at odds with to refrain 
from preventing harm and suffering like this? We must have something to do with the 
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morality in caring for others and furthering their interests whenever necessary – moral 
beneficence. 
Let me illustrate Peter Singer’s advocacy for preventing harm and suffering 
through great sacrifice. I describe his position on the issue somewhat through my 
depiction of what we should do if we are seriously concerned for the lives of nine million 
people starving, but describing his position in depth of what we should do will help frame 
what we are at odds with. Singer introduces his Principle of Sacrifice which is a 
derivative of the principle of beneficence. The principle of beneficence basically states 
that people should be concerned for others and further their interests when necessary to 
do so. The Principle of Sacrifice, in particular, states, “if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it”1. It is undeniable that a majority of us 
have the power to prevent something bad from happening, especially when we are 
already willing to do so; but in doing so, it is just critical that we need not sacrifice 
anything that is of comparable moral importance. Consider, again, your neighbor 
donating food to you. Your neighbor should donate it because she does not sacrifice 
anything of comparable moral importance, but somehow if donating the food meant her 
father dying then she should not donate it. 
At any rate, Singer is concerned about large real world problems like starvation, 
poverty, natural disaster, disease, internal conflict, and more. He ultimately argues that 
we should all be sacrificing our benefits from a consumer-based society in order to 
                                                          
1 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1972), 231.  
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respond effectively to the needs of others, for this grants us the power to be in a position 
to prevent harm and suffering from happening. Namely, this puts us in the position to 
donate money to international aid agencies so they can provide aid to the sizeable 
problems Singer and the rest of us are concerned about. Indulging in consumption is not 
of comparable moral importance as is preventing harm and suffering for millions. This is 
why it is wrong to not donate money, because granted that we are in a position to prevent 
harm and suffering from happening by sacrificing our benefits from a consumer-based 
society, we should be. We ought to help regardless of our proximity to these problems 
and of the fact that other people can provide more than us. These are not reasonable 
excuses to refrain from sacrificing our resources and energies. Singer’s standards for 
world beneficence are very high and expects more than just people’s charity. His 
standards for world beneficence are such that we ought to always further the interests of 
others until we sacrifice something that is of comparable moral importance, otherwise, 
any inadequate actions are condemnable. 
Peter Singer’s ideal world depicts a reality where moral beneficence for others 
requires us to fulfill extreme demands. Although his Principle of Sacrifice derives from 
the principle of beneficence, his principle requires more out of agents than would the 
principle of beneficence alone. It requires agents to further the interests of others until 
they are sacrificing something of comparable moral importance and to always produce 
the overall good. Whether producing the overall good is to maximize the most happiness, 
benefit, or satisfaction or to produce the most value in humanity, doing so requires us to 
fulfill extreme demands as illustrated. Assuming Singer’s Principle of Sacrifice were in 
effect and we end starvation for nine million people, it would expect us to act on the next 
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project and the one after that to end other forms of harm and suffering. We are required to 
always produce the overall good, and harm and suffering are unpredictable and rampant 
throughout the world. We are not wrong for being seriously concerned for others when 
they are in desperate need nor for being willing to do something about it, but the amount 
of sacrifice needed to compensate for our level of concerns and fix the problem at hand is 
too great for us to bear.  
There must be something about the morality in caring for others and furthering 
their interests whenever necessary – moral beneficence – that we are at odds with. But 
why are we at odds with moral beneficence when the benefits of caring for others and 
furthering their interests are enormous? The answer: morality is too demanding. 
Morality’s requirements stockpile if all we are expected to do is move onto the next 
project and the one after that in order to prevent all forms of harm and suffering. Having 
to always produce the overall good until we sacrifice something of comparable moral 
importance is a never-ending job that confines us to only producing the overall good with 
no kind of devotion to ourselves.  
So I raise the question: why is morality too demanding? Specifically, what makes 
it too demanding? The answers to these questions vary and are open for discussion. There 
is no single and truthful answer that can understand the demandingness of morality and 
appease the perplexity of what makes morality too demanding. In light of the challenge to 
answer what makes morality too demanding, notable philosophers who have analyzed the 
demandingness of morality are Bernard Williams, Samuel Scheffler, Liam Murphy, and 
Richard W. Miller. They all present unique arguments that demonstrate how the 
demandingness of morality affects agents who are always acting to produce the overall 
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good. I will evaluate each of their arguments in the next chapter and based off their 
arguments I will discuss in depth what makes a moral theory too demanding to them.  
For brevity, Williams suggests that what makes a moral theory is too demanding 
is that it is unacceptable for a moral theory to detach agents from their aspiration of who 
they want to be. Scheffler suggests a moral theory is too demanding if it prevents people 
from realizing a greater role for their own person that goes beyond only producing the 
overall good. Murphy suggests a moral theory is too demanding when it becomes unfair 
to require people to acquire an excess of demands to fulfill because others do not fulfill 
theirs. And lastly, Miller suggests that what makes a moral theory too demanding is when 
a moral theory does not accommodate the very fundamental features that contribute to the 
wellbeing of a person’s life.  
Each philosopher’s view of what makes morality too demanding implicates that 
the demandingness of morality puts people at risk of completely forfeiting their identity, 
autonomy, and values. For the remainder of this thesis it will be important to 
conceptualize that people’s identity, autonomy, and values are encapsulated into the idea 
of their person. After I discuss what makes a moral theory too demanding for each of 
these philosophers in the next chapter, I will connect their views to each other to note 
differences and commonalities they have with each other in the third chapter. This will 
ultimately provide a good framework for me to develop and present my own argument of 
what makes a moral theory too demanding.    
7 
 
 
 
2. The Demandingness of Morality 
 
2.1 Williams: The Integrity Objection and Utilitarianism 
  
Consequentialism requires agents to act the action available to them that will 
produce the best state of affairs. Utilitarianism, in particular, requires agents to act on 
prescribed choices of actions that will maximize the most happiness, benefit, or 
satisfaction. As utilitarianism dictates what prescribed choice of action agents should take 
to produce the best state of affairs, it does not consider what agents would do on their 
own terms. Bernard Williams frames this lack of consideration in moral situations as a 
major problem agents face. He argues that having to act on prescribed choices of actions 
alienates agents from their own projects and as a result utilitarianism undermines agents’ 
integrity towards their projects. Williams draws the notion of negative responsibility that 
extends from consequentialism and applies it in utilitarian moral situations to 
demonstrate that agents in fact do become alienated from their projects and get their 
integrity undermined. 
It will be helpful to first review what consequentialism is interested in to 
understand how Williams draws the notion of negative responsibility from it. Williams 
states that consequentialism is “indifferent to whether a state of affairs consists in what I 
do or, or is produced by what I do… All that consequentialism is interested in is the idea 
of these doings being consequences of what I do”2. The consequences that Williams 
refers to are causations of what I do. A state of affairs results from consequences of what 
I do because I cause them to be the consequences from my actions or inactions. Further, 
                                                          
2 Bernard Williams, “Negative responsibility: two examples,” in Utilitarianism: for and against. (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 93. This chapter used can be found inside Williams’ section A critique 
of utilitarianism. 
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Williams says all agents are causally related because their actions and even inactions 
cause a state of affairs that affect someone else. All agents have access to a state of affairs 
by their own actions or inactions and thus are causally related to each other. 
Furthermore, it is also possible for some remote agent’s action or inaction to 
cause the original agent to change his choice of action he would have originally acted on 
without the remote agent’s intervention. Maybe you would have voted for a democratic 
president but some guest speaker at your college inspired you to vote for a republic 
president instead. A state of affairs could be a consequence of someone’s own action or 
inaction or a consequence of someone else’s intervention causing the original person 
choice of action. In a moral situation, it matters a lot what an agent does to produce the 
best state of affairs, and the intervention of a remote agent can seriously influence what 
the original agent will do in that moral situation. Consider you have a friend who wants 
to key scratch your neighbor’s car because he hates him. If it were just you, you would 
not do it, but because he is your friend, you let him do it. Williams draws the notion of 
negative responsibility in an example like this stating that “if I am ever responsible for 
anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to 
prevent”3. The consequence of this moral situation is pretty bad and was something you 
could have prevented. The things an agent could be negatively responsible for are things 
that the agent should reason through so he or she can produce the best state of affairs.  
 The notion of negative responsibility that Williams draws becomes resourceful in 
understanding how utilitarianism alienate agents from their own projects in moral 
situations. More importantly, it will demonstrate how utilitarianism undermines agents’ 
                                                          
3 Williams, “Negative responsibility,” 95. 
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integrity towards their own projects. To begin with, utilitarianism forbids any choice of 
action that is contrary to acting on its prescribed choice of action for a moral situation. 
This means agents are required to dispense their own projects if they are contrary the 
prescribed choice of action utilitarianism dictates. Williams shares an example of Jim 
who is an honored visitor in a small South American town and sees twenty Indians tied 
up against a wall for protesting against the government. Pedro, a captain, insists that Jim 
shoot one to spare the rest or else he will shoot them all. Under utilitarianism Jim should 
shoot one Indian to save the others. He will satisfy nineteen desires to stay alive and 
having only one dead Indian is better than having twenty dead. However, suppose Jim 
supports human rights and does research in this field. Shooting the Indian is conflicting 
for Jim because killing an Indian alienates him from his own project. He has to act 
against his project when he does not want to. He would rather not shoot an Indian. 
Despite Jim’s opposition to having to kill an Indian to maximize the most benefit 
for and satisfaction among the surviving Indians, the principle of impartiality applies in 
utilitarianism requiring Jim not to act biasedly. The principle claims that “there can be no 
relevant difference from a moral point of view which consists just in the fact…that 
benefits or harms accrue to one person rather than to another – ‘it’s me’ can never in 
itself be a morally comprehensible reason”4. That fact that Jim’s project is to support 
human rights and is in a moral situation where he will have to violate an Indian’s human 
rights is not a reason for not acting on utilitarianism’s prescribed choice of action. He 
cannot act biasedly in favor of what he wants to do because he does not want to accrue 
the personal harm of killing someone. And the fact that Pedro intervened by casing the 
                                                          
4 Williams, “Negative responsibility,” 96. 
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moral situation Jim is in is also not a reason not to acting accordingly. Jim has to kill the 
one Indian. 
Consider one more example before straightforwardly applying the notion of 
negative responsibility to demonstrate the problem of alienation and an undermined 
integrity. George is conflicted with taking a job that requires him to pursue research in 
chemical and biological warfare. He says he is opposed to chemical and biological 
warfare and he does not want to act against his project in dissenting chemical and 
biological warfare. However, if he does not take the job then it will go to someone else 
who is more than eager to do the job. This person would really contribute to expanding 
research in chemical and biological warfare and advance weaponry for this kind of 
warfare. Either George takes the well-paying job or he keeps his word and someone more 
eager than him takes the job, thus, threatening the peace of the future. Refusing the job 
will also not end the familial and financial strain George is in. The prescribed choice of 
action in this case is to take the job. George cannot act biasedly in favor of his own 
project when the utilitarian dictation is to maximize happiness, benefit, or satisfaction. He 
can have a job to help out with his situation and he prevent someone more eager than him 
from getting the job to do more bad than good. 
Both examples demonstrate that Jim and George have to dispense their own 
projects. If it were up to them to decide what to do, Jim would not have killed the Indian 
and George would have continued job searching. In this case, Jim would have been 
negatively responsible for letting all of the Indians die when he was in a position to 
prevent their deaths and George would have been negatively responsible for not taking 
the job when he was in a position to end the familial and financial strain he was in. The 
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fact that Jim could have prevented to the death of twenty Indians is something he has to 
consider when he deliberates a choice of action, and the same concept applies in 
George’s moral situation; but nevertheless, they do not want to detach from their own 
project and become alienated from them. There are feelings and values they associate 
with their projects that affect how they want to act in the moral situations they are in. 
At the same time though it is morally significant to prevent twenty deaths and 
someone else who is eager about research in chemical and biological warfare. This 
requires dispensing one’s own projects to act on the prescribed choice of actions that 
overcome the implications of being negatively responsible for not killing an Indian and 
for not taking the job. To any agent this entails becoming alienated from one’s own 
project and even worse this entails getting one’s own integrity toward their project 
undermined. Jim’s integrity towards human rights and George’s integrity to his own word 
get undermined by acting on their prescribed choice of actions. Despite utilitarianism 
maintaining that acting on the prescribed choice of actions are the obvious and right 
choices, they are problematic to act on because agents cannot relate their integrity to their 
projects5. Hence, Williams says that “utilitarianism cannot understand integrity” because 
it “cannot coherently describe the relations between a man’s projects and his actions”6. 
His integrity objection against utilitarianism highlights a major problem agents face if 
they cannot act on their projects and pursue them to lengthy extents. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Williams, “Negative responsibility,” 99. 
6 Williams, “Negative responsibility,” 100. 
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What Makes a Moral Theory Too Demanding? 
 What makes a moral theory too demanding is that it is unacceptable for a moral 
theory to detach agents from their aspirations of who they want to be. Utilitarianism 
dictates which prescribed choices of actions agents should act on and requires agents to 
dispense their own projects to act accordingly. Williams has shown that dispensation 
causes the problem of alienation and, as a result, agents get their integrity towards their 
projects undermined. Agents wind up acting in ways that are contrary to how they would 
have acted if they based their actions off the projects they subscribe to. The 
demandingness of utilitarianism appears when agents are acting on prescribed choices of 
actions that do not express who they are and who they want to be. Agents prefer 
consulting with the feelings and values they associate with their projects and exercising 
their integrity towards their projects because doing so ensures that they can protect their 
integrity towards their projects. More importantly, doing so engages them to act on their 
projects.  
It is important to note that Williams is interested in allowing agents to act on 
identity-related projects whether or not they produce some overall good. All that matters 
is that the projects themselves and the actions they take to act on them express who they 
are and who they want to be. Being able to do so connects them to their own person 
because they can express their identity, exercise their autonomy, and act on their values. 
If a dad’s project is to be the best father figure to his newborn daughter, then by all means 
he is free to do so and act in the whatever ways that will express who he aspires to be. In 
any case, to further depict what makes a moral theory too demanding based off this 
example, suppose that utilitarianism dictates he needs to help his local church run this 
13 
 
 
 
month’s food drive for homeless people every evening. The amount of happiness, benefit, 
and satisfaction is enormous compared to the utility from being the best father figure he 
could be to his newborn daughter. The dad is unable to protect and exercise his integrity 
towards his project. Without being able to express whom he aspires to be, it is evident he 
is unable to connect with who he wants his person to be. It is unacceptable for agents to 
have to become detached from their aspirations of who they want to be just so they can 
maximize happiness, benefit, and satisfaction. This is what makes a moral theory too 
demanding. 
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2.2 Scheffler: The Agent-Centred Prerogative 
 
Williams previously argued that as agents acted on morally significant projects, 
their dispensation of their own projects alienated them from their projects. As a result, 
their alienation undermined their integrity towards their projects. The lack of devotion to 
one’s own projects is concerning because these are projects that are personally significant 
and projects agents prefer to act on. Scheffler argues differently than Williams claiming 
that as agents act on their projects in strict proportion to their impersonal value, they fail 
to assign greater weight to their own projects. Thus, acting according to principle of strict 
proportionality is what alienates agents from their own projects. In order to overcome the 
problem of alienation as Scheffler describes it, he favors agents being able to assign 
greater weight to their own projects so they will not have to only focus on morally 
significant projects. This way agents can act on their projects out of proportion of their 
impersonal value.   
To begin showing how agents become alienated from their own projects, consider 
that there is a discrepancy between their concerns and commitments being generated 
“independently of the weight of those concerns in an impersonal ranking of state of 
affairs.” An agent recognizes that his own concerns are significant from a personal 
standpoint but they are less significant from an impersonal standpoint. There are other 
concerns he can undertake as morally significant projects to maximize the overall good. 
The agent must allocate energy and resources to the projects “he cares most about in 
strict proportion to the value from an impersonal standpoint of his doing so”7. When 
                                                          
7 Samuel Scheffler, “The Project and its Motivation,” in The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford 
University Press: 1994), 9. 
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there are other projects that are more morally significant compared to one’s own projects, 
then according to the principle of strict proportionality the agent should dispense his own 
projects. 
If it is between choosing to buy a pair of shoes for your nephew and using that 
money to buy ten meals for ten homeless people, then you must not buy the shoes and 
help the homeless. More people will benefit from an essential good. Despite the overall 
good produced though, there is a sense that buying the homeless meals alienated you 
from your own project in doing your nephew good thusly undermining your integrity 
towards that project. Buying your nephew shoes was personally significant to you but it 
was not morally significant from an impersonal standpoint. Your project in buying your 
nephew shoes had to be dispensed in order to fulfill a morally significant project. 
Furthermore, this shows that acting according to the principle of strict proportionality is 
specifically what alienates agents from their own projects. It is not as simple as agents 
dispensing their own projects, as Williams argues, that alienates agents from their 
projects. 
 In order to prevent consequentialism from causing the problem of alienation, it 
must accommodate agents’ interests in their projects. This is why Scheffler introduces an 
agent-centred prerogative. The prerogative alters how agents act in strict proportion to the 
impersonal value of their projects to acting out of proportion to the impersonal value of 
their projects. The alteration changes how agents act on things that are morally significant 
from an impersonal standpoint to acting on things that are personally significant from a 
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personal standpoint8. Under the agent-centred prerogative you would be able assign 
greater weight to possibly buying your nephew shoes. But what does it mean to assign 
greater weight to a project? How is it plausible? 
In order to understand the prerogative’s plausibility, it is important to understand 
two desiderata the prerogative meets. The prerogative supports a (i) coherent integration 
of the agent’s values and actions into a unified personality and (ii) an appropriate limit on 
the agent’s responsibility to his projects9. To explain the first desiderata, since agents are 
afforded greater weight to their own projects, they are able to apply their values towards 
their projects and act on those values through their projects. They can bridge a relation 
between their values and actions through their project which allows them to coherently 
integrate the relation into their personalities. For example, being able to practice guitar 
for four hours a day because you value making music as an art form allows you to relate 
that value with the action, and the relation between both really expresses who you are as 
they integrate coherently into your personality. If you were to value making music as an 
art form but only practice twenty minutes a day (the ideal being four hours a day), then 
the relation between value and action are not well connected and do not really express 
who you are or who you want to be. 
But what if you valued hitting people with a bamboo stick for satisfaction and did 
it? What good is the prerogative if it seems to also allow agents to espouse harmful 
values and act on those values? The second desiderata places an appropriate limit on an 
agent’s responsibility to his projects. That is, the agent cannot have zero responsibility 
                                                          
8 Samuel Scheffler, “Outline of a New Theory of Normative Ethics,” in The Rejection of Consequentialism 
(Oxford University Press: 1994), 18.  
9 Scheffler, “Outline of a New Theory,” 19.  
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when he devotes himself to his projects. The danger in the agent having zero 
responsibility with his projects is that he may take extreme advantage of whacking people 
with a bamboo stick because he values the satisfaction from it and can only realize that 
value by hitting people. Instead, the agent is responsible to a minimal but significant 
extent for which values he applies towards his projects and how he acts on those values 
through his projects. Scheffler suggests that the agent should make sure that the 
inferiority of his own project “to each superior outcome he could pursue instead” must 
not exceed “the degree of sacrifice necessary for him to promote the superior outcome”10. 
If you could buy ten meals for ten homeless people but you wish to harm homeless 
people for an hour, you must buy the ten meals. Harming homeless people for an hour is 
more sacrificial than the overall good you could produce. A limit on sacrifice to whatever 
project you want to devote more time and energy to places an appropriate limit on an 
agent’s responsibility to what projects he wants devote himself to. The second desiderata 
prevents agent’s projects from radicalizing for the worst. 
Because the prerogative meets both desiderata, agents are permitted to assign 
greater weight to their projects by devoting more time and energy to them; however, 
assigning greater weight to one’s own projects does not necessarily entail they can pursue 
them. The prerogative does not require agents to devote themselves to their projects. The 
prerogative just makes it permissible to sometimes decline to always produce the overall 
good so this way agents can devote more time and energy to their projects. Assigning 
greater weight to one’s own projects on these terms redresses the problem of alienation 
                                                          
10 Scheffler, “Outline of a New Theory,” 20.  
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because, again, agents can decline having to always produce the overall good. They do 
not have to dispense their projects and their personal significance to them. Nonetheless, if 
agents believe their projects are to produce the overall good, they are not prohibited from 
doing so11. By contrast, consequentialism alone makes it impermissible to decline 
producing the overall good. Agents have to always do so. This is why the prerogative is 
appealing, because agents can decline to always produce the overall good, assign greater 
weight to their projects, and qualify to produce the overall good in a way that does not 
alienate them from their own projects. 
What Makes a Moral Theory Too Demanding? 
A moral theory is too demanding if it prevents agents from realizing a greater role 
for their own person that goes beyond only producing the overall good. Under 
consequentialism agents are required to always produce the overall good which requires 
them to always act on morally significant projects to do so. Agents can only act on their 
own projects in strict proportion to their impersonal value and because their projects lack 
value from an impersonal standpoint, they are forced to dispense or subordinate their 
projects to morally significant projects. The inability of agents to act on their own 
projects confines the role of their own person to only producing the overall good. 
Because agents are confined to only acting on morally significant projects, agents cannot 
realize a greater role for their own person that goes beyond only producing the overall 
good. The potential of realizing a greater role for one’s own person that goes beyond only 
producing the overall good lies in being able to act on one’s own projects.  
                                                          
11 Scheffler, “Outline of a New Theory,” 22. 
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To explain, Scheffler’s prerogative affords agents greater weight on their own 
projects which in turn allows them to exercise a greater role that goes beyond only 
producing the overall good. It is important to keep in mind that as agents assign greater 
weight to their own projects, the projects they assign more weight are not only identity-
related projects. Based off Williams’ argument, the demandingness of a moral theory is 
too much when agents become detached from who they aspire to be. This suggests that 
agents want to assign more weight to the projects that express their identity, who they are 
and who they want to be; but based off Scheffler’s prerogative, agents can assign greater 
weight to identity-related projects and non-identity-related projects. Non-identity-related 
projects consist in interests to do things you want to like buying your nephew shoes, 
practicing guitar, or playing video games. While the role of an agent’s own person 
contributes to producing the overall good, the prerogative warrants a role greater to 
contributing to oneself as well by permitting agents to act on identity- and non-identity-
related projects. 
 Even though Scheffler and Williams have different arguments that entail different 
views of what makes a moral theory too demanding, their views nonetheless intersect on 
the subject of agents being unable to express their identities and therefore connect to their 
own persons. That is, because morality requires agents to dispense their projects, they 
become alienated them from the very projects and potential actions that express their 
identity. Both Scheffler and Williams subscribe to this view, but because Scheffler also 
considers non-identity-related projects, he would raise that agents are also alienated from 
their interests to their ideal ways of living. Practicing guitar or playing video, for 
instance, are one’s own interests to ways of live. Therefore, when the prerogative 
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warrants agents a greater role beyond only producing the overall good to contributing to 
oneself as well, they are in fact contributing to both their identity and their interests to 
ways of living. Identity-related projects allow agents to contribute to their identity and 
non-identity-related projects allow agents to contribute to their interests to ways of living. 
However, without the prerogative in effect, the demandingness of consequentialism 
prevents agents from realizing a greater role for their person that goes beyond only 
producing the overall good. It prevents agents from realizing how they can contribute to 
their own identities and interests to ways of living.   
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2.3 Murphy: Change in Compliance and the Cooperative Principle 
 
 It is in everyone’s interest to be helped whenever they are in need and the best 
outcome results when everyone needed to contribute to furthering people’s interests are 
responsive. Although every agent has to fulfill their share of demands to effectively 
respond to the needs of others, not everyone fulfills their share of demands. It is essential 
to always produce the overall good but without everyone’s full compliance to this aim, 
producing the overall good seems more challenging to do. Indeed it is challenging to 
those who continue to produce the overall good. They have to act on the unfulfilled share 
of demands in addition to their own to produce the best outcome possible. When there is 
a humanitarian relief effort and some of the volunteers stop working, those who continue 
to work have to work harder for the best results. Liam Murphy argues that compliant 
agents should not have to acquire an excess of demands and fulfill them to produce the 
best outcome. They should only have to fulfill their own share regardless of a change in 
compliance. After running through two principles that sustain the problem Murphy is 
concerned about, he finally settles on the one that does not require agents to acquire an 
excess of demands. 
(It is important to note that all three principles that will be explained are all 
derivative from the principle of beneficence. In the introduction I said that the principle 
of beneficence basically states that people should be concerned for others and further 
their interests when necessary to do so. Because they are all derivative from the principle 
of beneficence, they will correspond to the principle of beneficence on their own terms 
and conditions.) 
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 The Simple Principle is the first principle that poses the problem Murphy wants to 
resolve. The Simple Principle is the “simplest principle of beneficence require[ing] each 
person to perform the action, of those available to her, that will make the outcome best;” 
it “is equivalent to consequentialism”12. While every agent is expected to fulfill their 
share of demands to produce the best outcome, some will not, and those who continue to 
comply with the Simple Principle accordingly have to expend extra resources and 
energies to produce the best outcome possible. For instance, if a group of villagers are 
supposed to aid a nearby village that was wrecked by a huge wind storm but only three-
fifths of all helpers went, then those who go help are burdened with an excess of 
demands. They will each have to carry more repair equipment, expend more energy 
carrying the equipment and working all day long, and face a greater risk of injury during 
construction. Full compliance from the villagers would have leveled the amount of 
demands for everyone more evenly; but nonetheless, the situation compliant agents are in 
forces them to expend themselves more to produce the best outcome that full compliance 
by everyone would have produced. 
The Limited Principle is the other principle that poses the problem Murphy is 
concerned about. The Limited Principle is a combination of the Scheffler’s agent-centred 
prerogative and the Simple Principle. Recall that Scheffler’s prerogative allows agents to 
assign greater weight to their own projects and to act on those projects out of proportion 
to their impersonal value. Murphy says that “I can multiply the value of my own interests 
by some factor when assessing what I am required to do…the greater the multiplying 
                                                          
12 Liam B. Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 268. 
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factor, the less will be demanded of me”13. The factor Murphy refers to can possibly be 
the rate at which an increase in demands to fulfill warrants an increase in the value of 
one’s own interests. By increasing the value of one’s own interests, agents essentially 
create their own limit as to what level of demands they are willing to fulfill before they 
much rather act on their own projects. Nonetheless, the exercising the Limited Principle 
as described is not plausible with a change in compliance in moral situations. The 
absolute need to fulfill one’s own share of demands while there is a change in compliance 
renders people who increase value to their own interests as too self-interested.   
 Take for instance a college student Sara who is a volunteer tutor for other students 
and wants to assign greater weight in bonding with her friends outside of tutoring. She 
can assign greater weight to the point where she is just going to out with her friends on 
the same evening she is expected to tutor. If there are other tutors available during the 
evening session then this is not a problem. However, consider the following point before 
even considering a change in compliance in this situation. A problem begins to emerge. 
Although under Scheffler’s prerogative Sara is allowed to sometimes decline producing 
the overall good, her decline now burdens other tutors with an excess of demands to 
fulfill during the session. Sara increased the value of bonding with her friends too high 
and to others who now have an excess of demands Sara is too self-interested. And the 
same concept can apply in other situations that are more cause-worthy like a 
humanitarian relief effort. Deciding not to work during such an effort because of some 
other interest in mind displays too much self-interest. 
                                                          
13 Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” 275. 
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 Now consider a change in the number of tutors available during the evening Sara 
is supposed to tutor (assume the other tutors have valid excuses to not being present). 
Instead of there being five tutors as usual, there are now Sara and two others. Sara and 
the two others have an excess of demands to fulfill and Sara should definitely not 
increase the value of her interest to go bond with her friends. It will only burden the other 
two with more demands to fulfill. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable for Sara to increase 
the value of her own interest because with an increase of demands imposed on her, she 
should be able to assign greater weight to her own project to even out the burden on her. 
Even better, Sara should be able to assign greater weight to her project to draw the limit 
as to how much she is willing to do before she much rather go do what she is interested 
in. The problem with this rationale though is that Sara then becomes too self-interested in 
light of the fact that she has her own original share of demands she needs to fulfill as 
well. It is unfortunate she has to acquire an excess of demands and fulfill them but now 
she becomes part of the ongoing problem where not doing her part makes others do more.  
 Certainly the Limited Principle can allow agents to create their own limits as to 
what level of demands they are willing to take on before they much rather act on their 
own projects, but it does not accommodate changes in compliance. Even if the two tutors 
who were absent returned to the session somehow, Sara still should not assign greater 
weight to her own project. She will be too self-interested and becomes part of the 
problem Murphy is concerned about. The Limited Principle is self-defeating for it is not 
flexible enough to accommodate changes in compliance.   
Both principles explained so far are not suited to prevent agents from acquiring an 
excess of demands to fulfill in particular because they fail to meet the Compliance 
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Condition. The Compliance Condition “demand[s] the same of agents under partial 
compliance as under full compliance”14. It is a prerequisite for any principle to prevent 
agents from acquiring an excess of demands. Whether it is the village wreck example or 
the tutoring scenario with Sara, neither principle met the Compliance Condition. Both 
cases showed that agents who continued to do their part during partial compliance had to 
do more. Although it was emphasized more with the Limited Principle, both the Simple 
and Limited Principle cannot accommodate changes in compliance. Accommodating 
changes in compliance means the difference in meeting the Compliance Condition from 
not meeting it. Meeting the Compliance Condition ensures a fair distribution of demands 
whether or not a compliant agent is in full or partial compliance. Because the Simple and 
Limited Principle fail to meet the Compliance Condition, they fail to distribute fair shares 
of demands. 
An effective way of meeting the Compliance Condition is for agents to develop a 
relation to one another. Under the Simple and Limited principle, agents tend to fulfill 
their share of demands on an individual basis without any relation to other agents. The 
alternative is for agents to fulfill their share of demands on a collective basis with a 
relation to each other. If an aid agency expected everyone to do their part without a 
meeting to make sure everyone did their part right, it is possible for some to not have 
done all that they are supposed to for the best results. But if the aid agency expected 
everyone to do their part together and convene, then the best outcome is expected 
because everyone can hold each other accountable for doing their part. A relation among 
                                                          
14 Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” 279. 
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all agents is vital in making sure everyone does their part for the sake of togetherness and 
to esteem the point in fulfilling one’s own share of demands.  
Agents who fulfill their share of demands on a collective basis with a relation to 
each other are undertaking a “collective project” to produce the best outcome. A 
collective project connects agents in relation to each other because agents would be 
aiming to promote the good together. Outcomes are more successful when everyone is 
connected in aiming to produce the best outcome together. Producing the best outcome 
together becomes everyone’s morality and everyone is able to understand that morality is 
making the same demand on everyone. Even if there is a change in compliance, the 
agents still responsive can agree that they should not have to exceed their fair share of 
demands. By contrast, fulfilling demands on an individual basis without a relation to 
other agents affects agents so they do not feel moved by the rightness of their actions15. 
They undertake fulfilling their share of demands as an individual project without the help 
of others despite others having the same level of demands. There is no sense of 
accountability among the agents and they become withdrawn from producing the best 
outcome. 
 Hence, Murphy introduces the Cooperative Principle. The Cooperative Principle 
“does not prohibit agents in situations of partial compliance from sacrificing as much as 
would be optimal in those circumstances…it only requires as much sacrifice as would be 
optimal under full compliance”16. The Cooperative Principle meets the Compliance 
Condition because even if there are changes in compliance in some situation, the agents 
                                                          
15 Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” 279. 
16 Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” 280. 
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responsive to the situation only have to do their fair shares of demands. Their relation to 
one another allows them to agree on doing only their share. And there are ways to realize 
the Cooperative Principle. There can be agents in full compliance responding a petition 
that needs 200 signatures. If 200 agents sign then the aim is achieved in full compliance. 
There may be agents in partial compliance responding to a humanitarian relief effort such 
that there were more people who wanted to help but additional help was unnecessary. 
The noncompliance of those who could not help, however, does not entail that they need 
to make up for their lack of contribution somehow. They simply do their fair share next 
time17. The Cooperative Principle dissents acting on demands that exceed the fair share, 
although it is allowed, and thus, it meets the Compliance Condition. 
 The Cooperative Principle can accommodate changes in compliance, but it does 
not solve the issue of partial compliance. Partial compliance is still possible. 
Nevertheless, addressing partial compliance was never the problem at hand. Preventing 
agents from acquiring an excess of demands was the problem at hand. The Cooperative 
Principle “dissolves” agents’ excess of demands by orienting them to aim to produce the 
best outcome in relation to each other. As they commit to their own fair shares of 
demands, they ultimately avoid acquiring excess demands while producing some good. 
What Makes a Moral Theory Too Demanding? 
 What makes a moral theory too demanding is that it is unfair for a moral theory to 
require agents to acquire an excess of demands because others do not do their part. In a 
moral situation where there is full compliance among all agents, everyone has a share of 
demands they have to fulfill. Everyone is responsible for their share of demands and 
                                                          
17 Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” 286. 
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should be for their share only. However, when there is partial compliance, the agents who 
continue fulfilling their share of demands have to acquire an excess of demands to 
produce the best outcome possible. The demandingness of a moral theory is seen with 
compliant agents acting on their share and an extra share of demands that originally they 
were not responsible for. The burden of extra demands compliant agents have relative to 
noncompliant agents who have none is evidence of an unfair accommodation compliant 
agents had to make. Further, the accommodation is unfair too because compliant agents 
are unable to be only independently responsible for their own share of demands; rather, 
they have to also be responsible for the lack of responsibility other agents display with 
their own share of demands. It is something compliant agents do not want to be willing to 
do all of the time. Not only is having to acquire an excess of demands burdensome but so 
is having to be unwillingly responsible for other people’s share of demands. A moral 
theory is too demanding when agents have to make an unfair accommodation as such. 
 To add, Murphy does not seem to express much concern for agents not being able 
to express their identity, exercise their autonomy, or formulate their values. He only 
explicates concern for agents unfairly having to acquire an excess of demands because 
others do not do their part. Nevertheless, the implication of his concern stretches to how 
suppressed an agent’s own person must be to comply with the demand of having to 
acquire an excess of demands. The demanding burden of having to acquire an excess of 
demands because others do not do their part must deter an agent’s ability to express their 
identity, exercise their autonomy, and formulate their own values. Although Murphy does 
not seem to express much concern about this, it is worth noting to really depict how 
conflicting it is to have to acquire and excess of demands.  
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2.4 Miller: The Principle of Sympathy and Personal Policies 
 
 Recall Singer’s Principle of Sacrifice from the introduction where people must 
sacrifice their resources and energies without sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance in order to effectively respond to the needs of others. Although Miller 
understands Singer’s sentiment in condemning inaction and inadequate action when 
responding to people’s needs, he claims that Singer’s argument for maximal sacrifice is 
too radical and misconstrues ordinary morality18. Singer does not take into consideration 
the very basic features of human life that contribute to its wellbeing, namely, special 
relationships people have with others, partiality towards special relatives, personal 
histories, and one’s own circumstances19. These are all things people naturally think 
about that conflict with the level of sacrifice Singer expects from them. The Principle of 
Sacrifice imposes a significant risk of worsening people’s lives because they are expected 
to neglect the very things that build and support their wellbeing. This is why Miller offers 
a new approach to responding to people’s needs that takes into consideration the very 
things that contribute to a person’s wellbeing. By doing so, he argues in favor of 
alleviating the level of sacrifice agents should exert when responding to people’s needs 
so they are not in a significant risk of worsening their lives when they respond to people’s 
needs. 
Miller introduces the Principle of Sympathy which states: “One’s underlying 
disposition to respond to neediness as such ought to be sufficiently demanding that giving 
                                                          
18 Richard W. Miller, ”Beneficence, Duty and Distance.” Philosophy and Public Affairs. (Blackwell 
Publishing, Inc., 2004), 358. 
19 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 383. 
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which would express greater underlying concern would impose a significant risk of 
worsening one’s life, if one fulfilled all further responsibilities; and it need not be any 
more demanding than this” (the Principle of Sympathy is also a derivative from the 
principle of beneficence which will correspond to it on its own terms and conditions)20. 
In order to be dispositioned to respond to neediness, one must be have a basic concern for 
people’s needs to sympathize with those people in need. This way agents can effectively 
respond to people’s needs because they sympathize with those needs. It is important to 
understand though that all agents develop and have distinct basic concerns that they 
ascribe to be important to them. Sarah can be concerned about world hunger, Jimmy 
about world poverty, and Pape about free school lunches. Everyone sympathizes with 
different needs people have but still they will all express the same underlying 
responsiveness to neediness. In other words, everyone will respond to neediness but 
through their own sets of “personal policies”21. With an array of things to sympathize 
with, agents have unique personal policies guiding them towards what causes they want 
to respond to and what form of aid they will direct towards those causes. 
Take for example two women. One is religious and the other is a lawyer. The 
religious lady may want to donate to her church to help her church stay open for her 
community and the lawyer may want to donate money to fund a debate team for students 
who want to be lawyers in the future. They each have their own basic concerns, 
sympathize with different kinds of neediness, and have different personal policies guiding 
how they will respond. The religious lady responds to her community by donating to her 
                                                          
20 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 359. 
21 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 360. 
31 
 
 
 
church and the lawyer responds to ambitious lawyers by funding a club, and both need to 
only respond until too much sacrifice puts their lives in significant risk of being worse 
off. That is, if both these women value their relationships with their kids, they should not 
have to donate so much that they cannot take their kids on an excursion. Their 
relationships to their kids contribute to the wellbeing of their lives. The Principle of 
Sacrifice, however, would dictate that taking one’s own kids out is not of comparable 
moral importance compared to donating sums of money to end world hunger. It would 
completely overlook what contributes to these women’s wellbeing. The aim of the 
Principle of Sympathy is ultimately the same as the Principle of Sacrifice but, again, 
different from it in that it takes into consideration the things that contribute to a person’s 
wellbeing. More on the latter point will be visited throughout this discussion. 
Consider a different scenario where the religious lady buys a raffle ticket for some 
prize while the rest of the money goes to the church and the lawyer invests her money for 
financial security for her family. If the Principle of Sacrifice were in effect, both these 
women would not be responding to the correct needs and should be responding to larger 
world problems. Further, the Principle of Sacrifice would consider that these personal 
policies are pursuing exorbitant goals because they involve some degree of self-interest. 
Nonetheless, the Principle of Sympathy considers that since the religious lady is still 
responding to her community and her religion is her identity, her buying a raffle ticket is 
acceptable; and since the lawyer is responding to her family’s security and relates a lot 
with her family, investing her money to respond to her family’s future security is 
acceptable. Both these women are still responding to some need with respect to things 
that contribute to their wellbeing. However, if all they sought was purely to contribute to 
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their wellbeing by buying lottery tickets, then this would be a personal policy with no 
response to any need, pursuing only an exorbitant goal22. Exorbitant goals must not be so 
excessive that they interfere with the purpose of a personal policy in responding to the 
needs of others. 
 Considering all, agents can ascribe their personal policies to all the things they are 
concerned about without having to forfeit all the things that contribute to the wellbeing of 
their lives. This is a good measure in preventing agents from putting their lives in 
significant risk of being worse off. In addition, agents can ascribe their personal policies 
to low scale concerns versus having to only ascribe to large scale concerns like poverty, 
hungry, humanitarian relief, etc. They can respond to needs very immediate to them like 
their family or own community instead of having to stretch their beneficence very far. 
The Principle of Sympathy affords agents a sense of autonomy in what they can be 
concerned about as it affords and how they can be concerned about while entitling them 
the wellbeing of their own lives. By contrast, the Principle of Sacrifice restricts agents’ 
autonomy and does not even consider all the fundamental features of human life that 
contributes to its wellbeing.   
Now that it is clear what the Principle of Sympathy is, it will be helpful to go in 
depth with how the principle withstands complicated eventual circumstances that seem to 
really put agents in significant risk of worsening their lives. To begin with, do agents 
have to do more when unexpected circumstances arise, for example, from a natural 
disaster that harms a population of people? Miller says there is a “commitment to 
sacrifice within a normally expected range in response to normally expected 
                                                          
22 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 363. 
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opportunities to protect from peril and a commitment to greater sacrifice in connection 
with circumstances of extreme peril that are not expected normally to occur”23. If 
someone already sympathizes with people’s need for food before a hurricane, the 
occurrence of a natural disaster can only intensify the urge to respond to those people in 
need. It is expected for agents to commit even more to their basic concern for these 
people in need considering that the circumstances require it. Because agents are already 
concerned to helping people in need of food, they can compromise with setting a higher 
point before any greater response to neediness significantly risks their lives being worse 
off. 
Supposing the religious lady also sympathizes with people in need of food, she 
will likely stop donating to her church or donate way less to her church and donate more 
to humanitarian relief efforts. Her personal policy’s ascription to people in need of food 
and the extremity of a large population in need determine she should respond a lot more 
to the people in need, and the same concept applies to the lawyer assuming she also 
sympathizes with people in need of food.  
Both these women need to only respond until the responding more puts their lives in 
significant risk of being worse off. That is, until they are at risk of forfeiting something 
that really contributes to the wellbeing of their lives. The only difference between the 
religious lady’s response and the lawyer’s response is that the lawyer can respond to 
people’s need of food more than the religious lady just because her occupation affords 
her a greater capacity to do so. This does not mean that the religious lady’s personal 
policy is inferior to the lawyer’s. Her personal policy can only adapt so much to 
                                                          
23 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 365. 
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unexpected circumstances due to her own circumstances. She probably has the same level 
of concern for the people in need that the lawyer has. But what if she had a lesser basic 
concern to people in need of food? Does that make her personal policy inferior to the 
other? The answer is no.  
Miller claims that although it is possible for an agent to be equally respectful of 
people who are in need, that is, appreciating an equal worth of everyone’s life, it does not 
entail being equally concerned for those people24. Without an equal concern for those one 
equally respects, an agent cannot respond to them all in the same way. For instance, a 
father may appreciate the equal worth his daughter and a homeless man thereby being 
equally respectful of both people, but he may be more concerned for the wellbeing of his 
daughter than the homeless man. The father will likely lend himself to his daughter than 
the homeless if both ever needed help with something at the same time. Ordinary moral 
thinking maintains “a choice is wrong if and only if it could not be made under the 
circumstances by someone displaying equal respect for all persons; equivalently, a choice 
is wrong if and only if it is incompatible with the ascription of equal worth to everyone’s 
life”25. However, partiality is a factor evident in special relationships like father and 
daughter that is not evident in a relationship between a father and homeless man. The 
father is not wrong for having a special relationship with his daughter, so he cannot be 
wrong for only helping his daughter despite having equal respect for both.  
To elaborate, partiality evident in special relationships does not pose a problem to 
the Principle of Sympathy. The Principle of Sympathy validates its contribution to overall 
                                                          
24 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 367. 
25 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 366. 
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good26. If the father’s daughter and the homeless man were inside a burning shop and 
only one person could be rescued by the father, the father will likely rescue his daughter. 
Despite placing an equal worth on both of their lives, he cannot be wrong to rescuing his 
daughter. Her rescue contributes to her wellbeing as well as his. His rescue prevents her 
death and prevents him from significantly worsening his own wellbeing by losing her. If 
he rescued the homeless man, he would not be wrong for not rescuing his daughter 
because he saves someone, but he worsens his daughter’s wellbeing and his own by 
losing his daughter. Partiality would be only be morally unacceptable if the agent’s own 
life was not at risk of being significantly worse of or if the agent’s actions were out of 
self-interest27. 
 So far the Principle of Sympathy has been applied when unexpected 
circumstances arise and in special relationships. Now it will be applied when agents are 
in proximity to a nearby moral situation. Miller illustrates that a man is in a rush to catch 
his flight for a conference for his last chance to become a professor but a baby is 
drowning in a pond. The man either does not put his life in significant risk of being worse 
off or he rescues the baby. Ultimately he rescues the baby. The situation is a life-versus-
death situation whereas the other previous cases have dealt with merely helping those in 
need or preventing some bad from happening. The costs of not responding to the situation 
are greater than the man being worse off. Either someone’s life is sacrificed or the man 
sacrifices his life being is worse off. The man had to save the baby. It would too great of 
sacrifice on his part if he let the baby die. He had to accept the fact that the small chances 
                                                          
26 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 367. 
27 Miller, “Beneficence, Duty and Distance,” 369. 
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of a baby drowning during a commitment of his own prevailed28. If he were the one 
drowning he would very much benefit from someone sacrificing their life being worse off 
than sacrificing his life away.   
 In sum, Miller’s Principle of Sympathy alleviates the amount of sacrifice agents 
exert when they respond to the needs of others. It is a favorable principle from Singer’s 
Principle of Sacrifice. The Principle of Sympathy accommodates the wellbeing of agents’ 
lives by making sure that that responding to neediness does not worsen their lives by 
significant margins. Agents can undertake their own personal policies to respond to 
others, ascribe to what they most sympathize with, and be well-protected from overly 
demanding efforts that worsen their lives. At large, the Principle of Sympathy enables 
agents to be flexible in responding to various kinds of neediness by letting them do the 
right thing nearly on their own terms.  
What Makes a Theory Too Demanding? 
 What makes a moral theory too demanding is when a moral theory does not 
accommodate the most fundamental features that contribute to the wellbeing of a 
person’s life. If it does not accommodate these features then it has no regard for and 
trumps the wellbeing of people’s lives. Miller demonstrates this is the very issue with 
Singer’s Principle of Sacrifice. When agents are acting according to the Principle of 
Sacrifice, they are constantly responding to serious needs with major moral implications. 
However, the Principle of Sacrifice does not take into consideration agents’ special 
relationships with others, partiality towards special relatives, personal histories, and their 
own circumstances. These are the most fundamental features that not only contribute to 
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the wellbeing of people’s lives but also constitute it. Neglecting these features 
misconstrues morality as Miller claims because neglecting these features demonstrates 
that morality confines the role of people’s own person to only producing the overall 
good. Certainly agents have a greater role for their own person that goes beyond only 
producing the overall good. 
What makes a moral theory too demanding for Miller touches base with what 
Scheffler believes makes a moral theory too demanding. Miller arrives at Scheffler’s 
view through a different line of reasoning but arrives nonetheless, and this is worth 
noting because this intersection emphasizes why an agent’s own person can be so 
confined to only producing the overall good. Neglecting the very features that contribute 
to and constitute the wellbeing of agents’ lives misconstrues the concept of morality as 
such because indeed it forces agents to only produce the overall good without any regard 
to the wellbeing of their lives. The wellbeing of their lives becomes irrelevant when 
acting on morally significant projects, as long as they are acted on. A lack of regard for 
the wellbeing of one’s own life essentially leads agents to become lost in morality 
without a sense of their own person. Without an accommodation to the most fundamental 
features that constitute the wellbeing of a person’s life, the demandingness of a moral 
theory imposes a mechanical outlook on one’s own life, a life meant only to produce the 
overall good. A failure to regard the wellbeing of a person’s life entails a meaningless life 
from a person standpoint and one without its own person.  
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3. Morality’s Domain of Beneficence and Our Person 
 
The Demandingness of Morality on Our Person 
 
 In the previous chapter I evaluated all of the philosophers’ arguments and 
discussed their respective views of what makes a moral theory too demanding. In this 
chapter I will connect their views together to draw differences and commonalities they 
have with each other’s views. In doing so, there will be strengths and weaknesses to 
notice about each philosopher’s argument in addressing the demandingness of morality. 
As I draw the connections between all of the philosophers’ views of what makes a moral 
theory too demanding, I will use these differences and commonalities to ground a couple 
of claims that will leverage my argument of what makes a moral theory too demanding.  
 Murphy suggests that a moral theory is too demanding when it is unfair for agents 
to have to acquire an excess of demands because others do not fulfill their demands. 
Compared to Williams, Scheffler and Miller, Murphy’s view is the most different 
compared to their suggestions of what makes a moral theory too demanding. Williams 
and Scheffler both subscribe to the view that because of alienation, agents cannot act on 
the projects to express their identities; and Scheffler and Miller both subscribe to the view 
that when agents cannot realize a greater role for their person that goes beyond only 
producing the overall good, they cannot contribute to their own identities. Even though 
Williams’, Scheffler’s, and Miller’s views converge on the subject of identity, identity is 
not independently more important from the subjects of autonomy and values. They all go 
hand-in-hand and should not be disregarded as I only mention identity. 
At any rate, Murphy expresses no real concern for agents being unable to express 
their identity, exercise their autonomy, or formulate their values. All he is concerned 
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about is compliant agents making unfair accommodations for noncompliant agents who 
do not fulfill their share of demands. In the discussion of what makes a moral theory too 
demanding for Murphy, it was included to deepen the analysis that Murphy’s concern 
about unfair accommodations by compliant agents must insinuate an extended concern 
for suppressing agents’ own persons. However, this is not his main concern. For this 
reason, we can ignore Murphy’s view of what makes a moral theory too demanding for 
the remainder of this thesis. It will not contribute much to my argument to come. This is 
not to discredit Murphy’s view at all, because it still answers what makes a moral theory 
too demanding, but it will not contribute much to my argument overall besides to my first 
claim.  
My first claim I want to establish is that we all have lives that we are entitled to 
outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. Murphy’s view shows that when compliant 
agents make unfair accommodations by acquiring an excess of demands, they are forced 
to participate inside of morality’s domain of beneficence. These unfair accommodations 
confine agents to morality’s domain of beneficence and undermines people’s entitlement 
to their own lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. As I draw comparisons 
among Williams’, Scheffler’s, and Miller’s views next, it will be conceivably 
understandable that you and I indeed do have lives we are entitled to outside of 
morality’s domain of beneficence. After we agree to this claim, I will posit a second 
claim to help explain why we are entitled to our lives outside of morality’s domain of 
beneficence. 
To start with Williams’ and Scheffler’s views on what makes a moral theory too 
demanding, their views differ but their argumentative means in arriving at their own 
40 
 
 
 
views are agreeable. Williams and Scheffler both recognize that acting on morally 
significant projects alienates agents from their own projects and, in turn, their integrity 
towards their projects is undermined. Scheffler introduces the agent-centred prerogative 
so agents can assign greater weight to their projects and sometimes decline producing the 
overall good. Unlike Williams who only considers identity-related projects, Scheffler 
considers both identity-related and non-identity-related projects. In this case, the 
prerogative prevents agents from always being alienated from projects that contribute to 
both their identity and their interests to ways of living. Regardless of Scheffler’s 
additional consideration for non-identity-related projects, Williams is only concerned 
about projects that contribute to expressing one’s own identity. 
And even though I am interested in claiming that people have lives they are 
entitled to outside of morality’s domain of beneficence, I will also discount the relevance 
of acting on non-identity-related projects to establish this claim. To Williams’ respect, I 
am only interested in considering projects that promote identity and not ways of living. 
Identity is intrinsically more tied to the idea of one’s own person compared to one’s 
interests to ways of living. The version of the person I have in mind is basic. It consists of 
one’s own identity, autonomy, and values independent of any interests to our ways of 
living. Including our interests to our ways of living will only inflate the version of the 
person I have mind and will not be necessary to claim we have lives we are entitled to 
outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. A basic version of our person will 
adequately establish this claim. 
To continue the comparison between Williams and Scheffler views of what makes 
a moral theory too demanding, Williams would also find that the prerogative does not 
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adequately connect agents to their aspirations of who they want to be. Williams 
challenged utilitarianism with his integrity objection because agents’ integrity towards 
their projects was vulnerable to agents acting differently from what their own projects 
would have suggested. The prerogative does not permit agents to always act on their 
projects so they are unable to always express who they are and who they want to be. The 
prerogative only allows agents to consult with their integrity towards their projects, 
thereby assigning greater weight to their projects, and sometimes act on their projects. 
Because the prerogative does not always protect agents’ integrity towards their projects 
by allowing them to always exercise it, it fails to connect them consistently to their 
aspirations of who they want to be.  
Despite this inadequacy for Williams, Scheffler’s prerogative taps into giving the 
problem of alienation a solution. So even though the prerogative is not entirely 
satisfactory to address Williams’ view of what makes a moral theory too demanding, it 
makes some progress in approaching his view. Without having to be alienated from one’s 
own projects all the time, the prerogative provides people possibilities to connect to one 
own aspirations of who one wants to be. As it relates to my claim, it provides people 
possibilities to live their lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence when they can 
express themselves through their projects from time to time. Without the prerogative, our 
entitlement to our lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence is certainly 
undermined. 
 Scheffler’s prerogative draws another interesting comparison with Miller’s 
personal policies. The comparison will also show that acting on non-identity-related 
projects are not to be concerned with and that people are entitled to their lives outside of 
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morality’s domain of beneficence. Consider, again, both identity- and non-identity-
related projects the prerogative affords greater weight to. Scheffler suggests that 
permitting agents to also contribute to their interests to ways of living helps them realize 
a greater role for their person that goes beyond only producing the overall good. An 
additional role in contributing to one’s own interests to ways of living adds more to 
someone’s life outside of morality’s domain of beneficence than simply contributing to 
one's own identity would. This means that the role of someone’s person outside only 
producing the overall good is greater if they can act on non-identity-related projects than 
merely acting on identity-related projects. 
  Despite the appeal in warranting agents the ability to act on identity- and non-
identity-related projects, Miller would deny the necessity in affording agents greater 
weight to non-identity-related projects. Being able to contribute to one’s own interests to 
ways of living is not one of the most fundamental features that contribute to the wellbeing 
of people’s lives, let alone constitute it. Rather, contributing to one’s own identity is one 
of the most fundamental features that contribute to the wellbeing of our lives. A plurality 
of identity-related projects encompass the most fundamental features that contribute to 
the wellbeing of our lives. Assessing the personal policies Miller affords agents can 
further settle why non-identity-related projects are not important to live one’s own life 
outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. Because agents ascribe their personal 
policies to concerns they find most important, they are ascribing their personal policies to 
projects and causes they find valuable. The value they attribute to the projects and causes 
they find most important allows them to compromise with the fact that their role is 
subject to producing the overall good. Take for example finding value in donating to 
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medical research on a weekly basis for a breast cancer cure. You can compromise with 
donating to medical research on a weekly basis for a breast cancer cure because of the 
value you attribute it. The value you attribute to some project allows you to compromise 
with your role in producing the overall good. 
Even more, the fact agents are acting on projects and causes they value reflects 
that they are acting on projects and causes that express their identities, so while they are 
acting on a morally significant projects to produce the overall good they are also 
contributing to their own identity. Donating to medical research expresses you are a 
believer in the fight against breast cancer. To a considerable extent, Miller’s personal 
policies address Scheffler’s concern that a moral theory is too demanding when it 
prevents agents from realizing a greater role for their person that is confined to only 
producing the overall good. Agents ascribe their personal policies to projects and causes 
they value which subjects them to having a role they can compromise with in producing 
the overall good and still contribute to their own identity. Although agents who utilize 
personal policies are using their person to participate in morality’s domain of 
beneficence, it is like they are not at the same time because they were never forced to and 
the projects and causes they are acting on is by choice. In a sense, agents are living 
outside of morality’s domain of beneficence because they are acting on projects and 
causes they value anyway. 
 Based off the comparisons made so far, Williams and Miller seem to be the most 
identity-centric when assessing what makes a moral theory too demanding. Williams is 
interested in granting agents the ability to act on their projects to allow them to protect 
and exercise their integrity towards their projects so they can express who they are and 
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who they want to be. Miller is interested in affording agents personal policies so they can 
act on projects and causes they value, thereby expressing who they are and who they 
want to be. The difference between Williams’ and Miller’s interests, however, is that 
Williams’ interest for agents to be able to act on their own projects is open to agents 
acting on both altruistic and non-altruistic projects while personal policies promote only 
altruistic projects29. For example, if you won a $500,000 lottery, do you save it to secure 
your kids’ education and your family from financial insecurity in today’s unpredictable 
times, or do you donate it to an orphanage because you value it and know they it will be 
able to take in double the orphans for the next five years. Whatever you do, you can 
identity as a family man who wants to provide or a beneficent orphan lover. From 
Williams’ perspective your choice is open whereas from Miller’s perspective your choice 
will be to donate the money because you find value in the orphanage.  
Whether or not Williams subscribes entirely to Miller’s support for personal 
policies depends if Williams believes that agents are entitled to both altruistic and non-
altruistic projects. Although he never states, it seems that he would believe so for the 
purposes that including both project types entail more projects available to connect agents 
to their aspirations of who they want to be by acting on them (I will refer to this point 
later in my argument). To the same extent that Miller’s personal policies provide a 
solution to the problem of alienation by orienting agents to act on altruistic projects must 
be the same extent to which Williams supports personal policies. And compared to 
                                                          
29 I credit Professor Schroeder for this insight on Williams’ position about altruistic and non-altruistic 
projects.  
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Scheffler’s prerogative, Miller’s personal policies are a better approach to Williams’ 
concern for what makes a moral theory too demanding.  
 In sum, we can see that Miller’s personal policies are the most unraveling to the 
demandingness of morality as he, Williams, and Scheffler see it. His identity-centric 
approach, respectively, accommodates the most fundamental features that contribute to 
the wellbeing a people’s lives; offers a better way to connect agents to their aspirations of 
who they want to be; and allows agents to compromise their own person’s role in 
producing the overall good while also going beyond it to contribute to their own identity. 
Most importantly, it is conceivably understandable that people have lives outside of 
morality’s domain of beneficence they are entitled to. We can all agree to this based off 
the comparisons drawn between the philosophers’ views of what makes a moral theory 
too demanding. 
 What is next is to explain why we are entitled to our lives outside of morality’s 
domain of beneficence. The second claim I will posit soon will help explain why we are 
entitled to our lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. But first, I want to 
remind you that the common denominators that make up our lives outside of morality’s 
domain of beneficence are our identity, autonomy, and values, independent of our 
interests to our ways of living. Our person is the very body that encapsulates our identity, 
autonomy and values. With our ability to express our identity, exercise our autonomy, 
and formulate our own values, we can define and shape our own persons. With our own 
definitions and manners to shape our person outside of morality’s domain of beneficence, 
we are able to live our lives the way we are entitled to. 
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But when Singer’s advocacy for great sacrifice, or morality in general, require us 
to always act beneficently towards others, great demands are imposed on our person. 
They prohibit defining and shaping our person in the way we want to by deterring our 
ability to express our identity, exercise our autonomy, and formulate our values. In turn, 
the demandingness of morality restrains us from our lives outside of its domain of 
beneficence and from how we want our lives to be. All of the philosophers discussed 
frame this issue one way or another, and the issue puts us in a position to question a 
number of things. (1) What identity do we possibly have to identify ourselves with 
besides an identity of great moral beneficence; (2) what autonomy can we exercise to act 
in ways that distinguishes us from mechanically acting out of pure beneficence; and (3) 
what capacity do we have to formulate our own values that are not so tied to only 
concerns for humanity? These are big concerns the demandingness of morality incites in 
us because it confines our own person to its domain of beneficence. 
 It is natural for us to have serious levels of concerns for people in desperate need, 
but there is a certain point when an amount of sacrifice that adheres to the severity of our 
concerns is too great for us to bear. Many of us much rather be sympathetic than 
apathetic towards people’s needs, so we cannot just choose to not be concerned about real 
world problems; but nonetheless, it becomes unfeasible for us to carry out the amount of 
sacrifice that adheres to our severe level of concerns. Our own person, our identity, 
autonomy and values, is so innate to us that it is hard for us to even risk forfeiting it for 
good in order to always produce the overall good. Nevertheless, the demandingness of 
morality constantly puts us in the position to forfeit our person. 
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We want to realize the full potential of our own person which is why we have a 
natural tendency to want to develop our identity, autonomy, and values on our own terms 
independently of morality. With regards to Williams, connecting to our aspirations of 
who we want to be is essential to developing our person. With consistency, we are bound 
to mature our person to be what we want it to be. Similarly, Miller affords agents 
personal policies that help agents develop their own person around the values they find 
important and identify with. Even Scheffler, considering identity-related projects only, 
would agree that extra devotion to these projects can guide us away from morality’s 
domain of beneficence the way we want to. Only then do we have the possibility to 
develop our own person.  
Moreover, when we have ownership and control over the development of our 
person, we are able to connect to our own person. Hence, my second claim: the relation 
between development of and connection to our person is precisely what is innate to our 
person. This relation between the development of and connection to our person is 
undoubtedly innate to us because we very capable of sustaining the relation to realize the 
full potential of our person. It is a relation we yearn to own and control. The 
demandingness of morality, however, interferes with our ownership and control over this 
relation because it forces us to accept a few things. For one, we are forced to accept that 
the role of our person belongs inside morality’s domain of beneficence. Second, we are 
forced to accept that morality separates us from how we want to develop our own 
persons. And third, we are forced to accept that morality undervalues, disrespects, or 
simply does not understand our persons. These are all things that Williams’, Scheffler’s, 
and Miller’s views of what makes a moral theory too demanding were concerned about. 
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Without ownership and control over the relation at stake here, we are bound to forfeit our 
identity, autonomy, and values in order to produce the overall good. 
 With full ownership and control over the development of our person, we can aim 
for projects that define and shape our person. For example, we can aim to act on 
sophisticated projects like expanding a field of literature through research, joining an 
activist organization that will fight for reforms in our country, and starting our own 
companies or nonprofits to improve people’s way of life. We can also aim to act on 
trivial projects like becoming a motivational speaker, working towards becoming a 
famous musician, and being the best video-gamer. These are all an array of identity-
related projects in their own way that can develop our person and allow us to connect to 
it. 
Because of the plurality of projects we can aim for to develop our person, drawing 
one final comparison between Williams and Miller will support my second claim and 
help explain why we are entitled to lives outside of morality’s domain of beneficence. 
There is a resemblance between sophisticated projects and altruistic projects because of 
the overall good produced for others and between trivial projects and non-altruistic 
projects because they benefit the agent more than others. With this in mind, Williams’ 
position on acting on identity-related projects entails that we would be able to develop 
our person and connect to it through both sophisticated and trivial projects. Miller’s 
position on acting on identity-related projects, however, entails that we would only be 
able to act on sophisticated projects. For Williams, producing overall good is not 
essential to acting on identity-related projects whereas it is with Miller and his personal 
policies. This distinction shows that William’s position on acting on identity-related 
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projects yields a fuller expression of our identity, greater exercise of our autonomy, and a 
wider formulation of our own values. His interest maximizes the kind of person we can 
potentially develop outside of morality’s domain of beneficence if we are afforded the 
privilege to act on any of our projects consistently. 
 People are very capable of developing their person through an array of identity-
related projects; and the final comparison between Williams and Miller shows we are 
capable of developing our person to its full potential if we do not have to always produce 
the overall good. To Williams’ advantage, allowing people to act on any of their identity-
related projects maximizes the development of their person and thus connects them to 
their person in the best way possible. His position supports how innate the development 
of and connection to our person is. The potential that someone has to develop their person 
and connect to it outside of morality’s domain of beneficence entitles them to live up to 
that potential. This is why we are entitled to our lives outside of morality’s domain of 
beneficence. Miller falls short in allowing agents to maximize the development of their 
own person so they can connect to it in the best way possible. It is not bad if you value 
starting our own nonprofit to better people’s way of life and if you can compromise with 
being subject to producing the overall good; however, Miller’s personal policies fail to 
maximize the development of your person when there are trivial projects you are 
probably inclined to undertake as well.  
What makes a moral theory too demanding is when a moral theory takes 
ownership and control over the potential development of and connection to our own 
person. The demandingness of morality dictates us away from who we can potentially 
become outside of its domain of beneficence, and as a result, we forfeit much of our 
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identity, autonomy, and values that could have been. We must be able to determine 
whom our person will be or what kind of purpose we want to bestow on it to become that 
person. Our determination as such should be independent of any moral requirements and 
conditions interfering with this relation. William’s position best supports my view of 
what makes a moral theory too demanding because his position is not preoccupied with 
the need of undertaking identity-related projects to produce some overall good. As long 
as acting on the project connects us to our aspirations of who we want to be, then we are 
free to do so. The potential of our person – identity, autonomy, and values – is found 
beyond the demandingness of morality and in the projects that afford us the most 
ownership and control over the potential development of and connection to our person. 
  
51 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
Miller, Richard W. “Beneficence, Duty and Distance.” Philosophy and Public Affairs (2004): 
357-383. 
 
Murphy, Liam B. “The Demands of Beneficence.” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1993): 267 
291. 
 
Scheffler, Samuel. “The Project and its Motivation” and “Outline of a New Theory of Normative 
Ethics.” In The Rejection of Consequentialism, 7-22. Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Singer, Peter. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs (1972): 229- 
243. 
 
Smart, J.J.C and Williams, Bernard. “Negative responsibility: and two examples.” In 
Utilitarianism: for and against, 93-100. London: Cambridge University Press, 1973.  
 
